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FAULT DIVORCE AND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
DONALD S. MOIR*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental change from law which sought-to the extent the
law could-to uphold and sustain the institution of the family' to law
2
which facilitates its dissolution began less than twenty-five years ago.
5
4
Weitzman 3 has called the change a revolution, Glendon and Jacob
have called it a transformation of the law. Jacob calls it a "silent revolution"-a revolution brought about by "experts" with little public discussion. 6 The revolution has been silent, in that until recently there has been
no public and little professional awareness of its impact. Consequences
have emerged 7 that were not within the horizons of the reformers. 8
Wallerstein 9 has commented on "how little we really know about
the world we have created in the last twenty years--a world in which marriage is freely terminable at any time, for the first time in our history." 10 But to
say we know little is not to say we know nothing. There is substantial
* Barrister and Solicitor, Moir Associates, Vancouver, Canada; University of Toronto (B.A., 1948); University of British Columbia (LL.B., 1951); Past President, Association of Family and Conciliation Courts; Past Chairman, Family Law Section, Canadian Bar
Association, B.C. Branch.
1. In this Article, "family" means husband and wife in an existing or former marital
relationship and children of that marriage, if any.
2. No fault divorce in the United States began with California's Family Law Act, ch.
1608, §§ 1-32, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). See
also Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath
56 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1, I & n. 1. For the progression of no fault divorce statutes through
the states, see Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 79. The grounds for divorce vary from state to state. Wardle classifies 13 states as
"pure" no fault. Other states' statutes contain mixed grounds. Id. at 137.
3. See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
4. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW:
LAW, AND FAMILY IN TIE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989).

5. See generally HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION:
VORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988).
6. Id. at 15.
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7. Some argue that the present high rate of divorce is a social phenomenon, not a
legal one. As to that argument, see infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text. In this Article "reformers" include
all those who advocated and brought about change in the law. Principal sources of information are Kay supra note 2, at 5 nn.14 & 16, citing the CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N
ON THE FAMILY, REPORT 1-2 (1966); JACOBS, supra note 5, at 66-79 & nn.10-32.
9. Dr. Judith S. Wallerstein is Executive Director of the Centre for the Family in
Transition, Corte Madera, California.
10. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN,
AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 297 (1989)(emphasis in original).

A recent Canadian study found that "[t]he rise of divorce . . . over the past twenty
years makes it appear that the institution of marriage, having held firm for centuries, is
being shaken to its foundations." JEAN DUMAS & YVES PgRON, Preface to STATISTICS CANADA,
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documentation of two consequences of the "free terminability of marriage:" (1) the impoverishment of divorced women together with the
children in their care, 'land (2) the risk of harm to children of divorce.
That there are other consequences of endemic family breakdown
broadly affecting society and the economy is apparent, but the available
data is insufficient to permit more than informed speculation about their
nature and extent. Indeed, it would be surprising if a revolution affecting our basic institution did not substantially affect the social structure
and the economy.
The divorce revolution has brought with it grave consequences.
This Article will consider those in relation to children. Without diminishing the accomplishment of those single parents who, under great difficulties, do, it argues that our society does not know how to raise
children well-emotionally, economically, developmentally--except in a
secure institution of marriage. If that institution "has been shaken to its
foundation"' 12 in part, at least, because of no fault divorce,' 5 the law
must be reconsidered if society and the economy are to function up to
their potential. 14
The Article will suggest that in the concern about symptoms rather
than causes, conventional scholarship in family law, and, in the
behaviourial sciences, has failed to address fundamental issues. I propose a different way of addressing them.
The Article does not offer solutions; that task calls for the knowledge and insights of a broad spectrum of disciplines. I argue that the
DEMOGRAPHY DIVISION, MARRIAGE AND CONJUGAL LIFE IN CANADA: CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC

ANALYSIS (March 1992).
11. WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 338. Weitzman found in her California sample that at
the time of her study, divorced women experienced a 73% drop in their standard of living
a year after divorce, whereas divorced men experienced a 42% increase. Weitzman attributes her well-known finding to no fault divorce. See also James B. McLindon, Separate But
Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorcefor Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 352-53
(1987) (a compilation of studies in other states in addition to McLindon's own New Haven
County, Connecticut study); H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriageand Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986). Weitzman has critics: See
JACOB, supra note 5, at 159-64; Herbert Jacob, FaultingNo-fault, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 77381 (1986); Marygold S. Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women
and Children, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759-72 (1986). But see Weitzman's reply, Bringing the
Law Back In, AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 791-97 (1986). The most penetrating critique of Weitzman is that ofJed H. Abraham, The Divorce Revolution Revisited: A Counter Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 251 (1989). The essential difference between Weitzman and her
critics appears to be the degree of impoverishment and whether it can be attributed to no
fault divorce. An effective support regime is inconsistent with the premises of no fault
divorce and, in any event, impractical in most family circumstances. A separated family is
economically inefficient. Two can live more cheaply as one.
12. Supra note 10, DUMAS & PRON.
13. See infra notes 100-126 and accompanying text.
14. The Article does not argue that a change in the law of divorce and ancillary relief
alone will diminish all the problems now affecting children. A whole spectrum of policy
issues needs correction: anti-child tax policy, the social support network, health, security,
physical security, education, housing and so on. There is an African saying that "it takes a
whole village to raise a child." Nevertheless, I argue that unless family law itself offers a
framework within which children can best be nurtured, a nation's capacity to correct the
broad spectrum of adverse policies will be diminished.
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policy choices are of great difficulty; that simplistic policy changes are at
risk of doing more harm than good.
II.

THE RISK OF HARM TO CHILDREN OF DIVORCE

The National Centre for Health Statistics reports that in 1988, children in single parent and step families were two to three times more
likely to have emotional and behavioural problems than those in intact
families. 1 5 Their academic achievement is significantly lower.' 6 There
is now a substantial literature reporting the results of empirical studies
of varying rigour and research design on the impact on children of the
divorce of their parents.1 7 This Article will review a few of the recognized longitudinal studies that have implications in structuring legal policy.' 8 Given the different research designs, the data are not totally
congruent but they do converge on two points: (1) the separation of
their parents is profoundly traumatic for all children (except those in
highly conflicted or abusive families) and interferes with their developmental progress for shorter or longer periods;' 9 and (2) a significant
minority of children of divorce do not recover and are chronically dis20
abled in their emotional, social and academic functioning.
A.

2
The Data: A Sampling '

The most frequently referred to study is that of Wallerstein and
Kelly, 2 2 pioneers in empirical studies on the divorce process and its impact on children. Starting in 1971 they followed sixty divorcing families
and their one hundred and thirty-one children ages three to eighteen
from Marin County, California, a white, privileged community.2 3 The
assumption at that time was that divorce was a brief crisis quickly resolved by the adults and children involved. Based on that assumption,
15. Nicholas Zill & Charlotte A. Schoenborn, Developmental, Learning, and Emotional
Problems: Health of Our Nation's Children, United States, 1988, 190 NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH
STAT. ADVANCE DATA

(1990).

16. John Guidubaldi et al., The Impact of ParentalDivorce on Children: Report of the Nation-

wide NASP Study, 12 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 300 (1983).
17. There are more than 700 reported studies. Interview with Dr. William F. Hodges,
Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, in Halifax, Nova Scotia (Oct. 22,
1990).
18. In doing so, I rely in substantial part on Joan B. Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment in
Children of Divorce: Converging Findings and Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 119
(1988) and Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects of Divorce on Children: A Review, 30J.

AM.

ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY

349 (1991).

19. Kelly, supra note 18, at 122; E. Mavis Hetherington, Stress and Coping in Children and

Families, in CHILDREN IN FAMILIES UNDER STRESS 7 (Anna-Beth Doyle et al., eds., 1984).
20. For the nature of the disabilities, refer to the studies. It is to be recognized that
there is no information about the children beyond the periods of study.

21. A summary of the researchers' findings risks making them appear less complex
than they are. The results and symptoms differ with age, gender, economic circumstances
and other factors. Nevertheless, these variations should not obscure the generality of the
findings reported here.
22. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980).
23. Id. The authors note, "[it may well be that there would be a considerably greater
emotional decline among children in a general population." Id. at 307.
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the authors' original intent was a short term study2 4 from crisis through
to resolution. As expected, they found the children to be acutely disturbed at the time of divorce filing. To their surprise, however, and contrary to the then professional expectation, when they assessed the
parents and children eighteen months after the divorce filing, they
found a large number of the children were on a continued "downward
course." In response to the unexpected finding, the study was continued and the parents and children were assessed again five years after the
25

divorce filing.

In summary, at the five-year assessment, the study found that
notwithstanding the initial trauma of the children, about a third had recovered and were doing "especially well," 2 6 a "middle" group of less
than a third had resumed their developmental progress but remained
somewhat symptomatic, 2 7 and the disabilities of more than a third of the
children observed immediately post divorce and at the eighteen-month
28
checkpoint had become chronic.
Wallerstein continued to follow a group of the children, 29 then
aged eleven to twenty-nine, some for ten years and others for fifteen.
She reported her findings in Second Chances.30 She reports that over half
the children "emerged as compassionate and competent people," while
almost half were "worried, underachieving, self-deprecating, and sometimes angry young men and women." Boys of school age suffered a
wider range of difficulties than did girls at that age, but in young adulthood the differences dissipated "when many of the young women were
involved in maladaptive pathways including multiple relationships and
31
impulsive marriages that ended in early divorce."1
Two new phenomena became apparent: (1) the "sleeper effect"those who were doing "especially well" at the five-year checkpoint, in
24. The assessment was essentially clinical, using a variety of techniques, together
with interviews of parents, siblings and teachers. The children were initially screened for
their psychological health-that is, the study was skewed in favour of sound pre-divorce
adjustment. Id.
25. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 25, at 4-5.
26. Id. at 209.
27. As to the "middle" group at the five-year checkpoint, it was found that
"[allthough these youngsters had resumed their developmental progress, islands of unhappiness or anger continued to demand significant portions of their attention and psychic
energy and to hamper the full potential of their development." Id. at 213.
28. The study:
[Flound 37 percent of all the children and adolescents to be moderately to severely depressed. As at the eighteen-month check point, depression was the most
common psychopathological finding and was manifested in a wide variety of feelings and behaviour, including chronic and intense unhappiness (at least one child
with suicidal preoccupation), sexual promiscuity, delinquency (drug-abuse, petty
stealing, some alcoholism, breaking and entering), poor learning, intense anger,
apathy, restlessness and, . . . a sense of intense, unremitting emotional
deprivation.
Id. at 211. Wallerstein later reported that at the five-year checkpoint most of these children were on a yet further downward course. Judith S. Wallerstein, Children After Divorce:
Wlounds That Don't Heal, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 22, 1989, at 19, 20.
29. One hundred thirteen out of an initial group of 131.
30. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10.
31. Wallerstein, supra note 18, at 354.
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particular, girls who had now become young women, became symptomatic; 3 2 and (2) the "over-burdened child"-the child who assumes a
parental role over an inadequately functioning custodial parent without
the buffering available from a functioning second parent.3 3 Particularly
disturbing for the purpose of this Article was that forty percent of the
nineteen to twenty-three year old young men remained aimless, had lim35
ited educations 3 4 and had a sense of limited control over their lives.
Mavis Hetherington and her colleagues at the University of Virginia
followed a matched group of children, half from intact and half from
divorced families for six years following divorce. 3 6 Children of divorce
were significantly more symptomatic 3 7 than those in intact families at
each of the examinations. Hetherington and her colleagues found the
problems to be more severe and enduring for boys than for girls of divorce and found that their socio-behavioural difficulties were not related
to income.
Guidubaldi and his colleagues conducted a longitudinal study of nationwide, randomly selected matched samples, about half from intact
families and half from divorced families. 3 8 Children from intact families
performed significantly better on socio-behavioural criteria and mental
health indices than did those from divorced families. The academic
achievement of children of divorce was much lower.
32. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10, at 56-64; Wallerstein, supra note 28, at
42.
33. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10, at 184-204; Judith S. Wallerstein, The
Overburdened Child: Some Long-Term Consequences of Divorce, 30 Soc. WORK 116 (1985).
34. She reports on a number of well-to-do college-educated fathers who would not
support their children at college. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10, at 154-60.
35. Wallerstein, supra note 28, at 42.
36. E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children in NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233 (Michael E. Lamb, ed., 1982);
E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarmiage on the Adjustment of
Children, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 518 (1985). Since then, Hetherington has
reported 40% of boys whose custodial parent remarries while the child is in early adolescence develop "serious" psychiatric problems. GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 9, 1991, at A4; Hetherington, supra note 17. There was a total of 144 white middle-classed children in the
group, all four years old when first examined. The children of divorced families were first
examined two months after the divorce (together with the others), two years later and after
a further four years when the children were ten. The assessment was primarily through
standardized objective psychological tests-as opposed to the essentially clinical approach
of the Wallerstein and Kelly study.
37. There are convenient summaries of the symptoms in Kelly, supra note 18, at 123
and Wallerstein, supra note 18, at 351-53.
38. John Guidubaldi, Differences in Children's Divorce Adjustment Across Grade Level and Gender: A Report from the NASP-Kent State Nationwide Project, in CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 185
(Sharlene A. Wolchik and Paul Karoly, eds., 1988); John Guidubaldi & Joseph D. Perry,
Divorce and Mental Health Sequelae for Children, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 531
(1985); John Guidubaldi et al., Assessment and Interventionfor Children of Divorce: Implications of
the NASP-KSU Nationwide Study, in 4 ADVANCES IN FAMILY INTERVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND
THEORY 33 (John P. Vincent ed., 1987). There were 341 children of divorce and 358 from
intact families. The children of divorce were first tested, on average, four years after divorce and two and three years later. Children from intact families, matched as to age and
sex were tested at the same times. There were standardized tests of socio-behavioural and
academic competence supplemented with information from parents, children, psychologists and teachers obtained in standardized interviews.
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Socio-behavioural scores did not vary when corrected for income;
those for academic performance did.3 9 As in the Hetherington study,
Guidubaldi found the disparity between divorced families and intact
families to be greater for boys than for girls. The disparity for girls decreased over the period of the study, 40 that for boys increased.
There is a recent report based on two large data bases, 4 1 one in
Great Britain, the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and one
in the United States, the National Survey of Children (NSC), 4 2 which
suggests a different etiology of the problems of children of divorce.
Both studies sought a broad range of information other than about children and divorce, but included in the report was information on divorce
in the cases in which it occured. There was information on pre-divorce
interspousal conflict in each of the studies.
The studies found the disabilities of children of divorce to be
greater than those of intact families. However, when pre-divorce
spousal conflict was taken into account, the statistical differences between the two groups (children of divorce and children in intact families) disappeared.
The authors of the report (Cherlin and his colleagues) concluded:
"[T]hose concerned with the effects of divorce on children should consider reorienting their thinking. At least as much attention needs to be
paid to the processes that occur in troubled, intact families as to the
' 43
trauma that children suffer after their parents separate."
B. Analysis
As we have seen, all the studies found among children of divorce a
higher proportion of dysfunction than among children in intact families.
The longer range studies show the dysfunction is chronic among a minority of children of divorce.
Cherlin and his colleagues attribute more of the post-divorce dysfunction to pre-divorce family conflict than the others appear to.4 4 All
39. For the scores, see Guidubaldi, Differences in Children'sDivorce Adjustment, supra note

38, at 202-24.
40. But note the "sleeper effect" observed in WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note
10, at 56-64.
41. Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children in Great
Britain and the United States, 252 SCIENCE 1386 (1991).
42. NCDS began as a survey of a total of all 17,414 mothers who gave birth in Great
Britian in one week in 1958. The study was not directed at children of divorce, but pertinent findings have been extrapolated from it. When the children were seven in 1965,
public health nurses interviewed their mothers using a standardized test. There were
reading and mathematics tests and behavioural assessments by teachers. Similar assessments were made in 1969 when the children had reached eleven. Id. at 1387. The NSC
survey began in 1976 with a national random sample of 2,279 children between seven and
eleven. Standardized assessments of their behaviour were made through telephone interviews of their mothers. The mothers were questioned, inter alia, about interspousal conflict. There was a second round of interviews in 1981 when the children were between 11
and 16. Id. at 1388. The data available from both studies permitted a comparison of the
performance of children in intact families and children of divorce.
43. Cherlin et al., supra note 41, at 1388.
44. The Hetherington study divided both the divorced and intact families into intense
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agree that high levels of family conflict to which children are exposed is
detrimental. The difference, if there is a difference, is critical to the policy maker. If Cherlin and his colleagues are correct that a significant
part of the post-divorce dysfunction observed in children can be attributed to pre-divorce family conflict, then in the interest of children, theoretically, the law ought to encourage the divorce of conflicted spouses.
If, on the other hand, divorce and its attendant circumstances is the
more significant causitive factor of the dysfunction observed than is predivorce conflict, then the law ought not to facilitate divorce as it now
does.
It may be that it is the degree of conflict that is crucial. There are
reasons to suggest that the conclusions of Cherlin and his colleagues,
important as they are to the policy maker, should be carefully examined,
if only to determine degrees of conflict:
45
(a) The data from the British NCDS was for the period from 1965

to 1969 when England and Scotland had rigourously fault-based regimes of divorce. In England, adultery was the only grounds for divorce; the remedy for cruelty was judicial separation.
The low rate of divorce reflected in the NCDS study,4 6 -two percent47-among the parents of the cohort probably reflects the then law.
It may follow that the small number of children, the subjects of Cherlin
and his colleagues' report, came from the most highly conflicted families. The experience of these children may not have been the same as
those of children from less conflicted families.
(b) In neither the British NCDS nor the American NSC did the children get better, as might have been expected if the conclusions are correct. They got worse.4

8

(c) Kelly has found that the stereotype of intense spousal conflict
preceding divorce is not always accurate. Fifty percent of her group reand low-conflict groups. Hetherington found no negative outcomes attributable to predivorce conflict among children who were sheltered from parental dispute--"encapsulated" was her term. In the first year following divorce, the children of divorce functioned
less well than those in intact, high-discord families. At two years, the difference among
children in high-conflict intact families and those in low-conflict divorced families disappeared. Boys from high-conflict divorced families showed more problems than any other
group at all times. See Hetherington, supra note 36.
45. Cherlin et al., supra note 41.
46. Furstenberg and Cherlin estimated that 44% of children born between 1970 and
1984 in the United States lived in single parent families before they were 16 and that the
rate for children born in the 1990s may be as high as 60%. FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. &
ANDREWJ. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART
11 (1991). See also Neil G. Bennett, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1990. § 4, at 12.

A March, 1990 census survey found that in 1970, 40% of households had a married couple
and child or children under 18 as opposed to 31% in 1980 and 26% in 1990. Change in the
American Family, Now Only I in 4 is "Traditional," N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 30, 1991, at A19. For the
purposes of this Article, I need not discuss the complex subject of the rate of divorce. It is
sufficient to note that the rate is much higher than it was before no fault divorce.
47. Two hundred thirty-nine out of 11',658. This refers specifically to the instances of
divorce occurring when the children were between ages seven and eleven. Cherlin et al.,
supra note 41, at 1387.
48. Cherlin et al., supra note 41, at 1387-88.

DENVER 'UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3

ported high conflict while twenty-five percent of women and thirty per49
cent of men reported little or no conflict.

(d) Wallerstein questions the reliability of market research methods
50
such as those of Cherlin and his colleagues.
(e) Wallerstein and Kelly selected their sample of children for psychological health at the time of divorce. That is, the sample is skewed
towards sound pre-divorce adjustment. 5 ' Yet five years after divorce,
they found a high proportion of dysfunction.
(f) A non-specialist may speculate that there may be something to
be learned from the predominant reconciliation fantasies of children,
the intense, enduring longing for the absent parent. Is this feeling
among such a high proportion of children no more than bizarre masochism? Or are the children telling us that even if parents quarrel (absent,
of course, abuse or spousal violence), children's healthy development
needs both parents in an intact relationship?
None of the data I have referred to (or other data available) is conclusive. Yet a policy maker never has the luxury of certainty. If evidence
shows there to be a likelihood of wide-spread social harm, 5 2 the concerned policy maker cannot wait for certainty. She must be cautiously
aware of the limitations of the social and behavioural sciences without
ignoring what they have to tell.
C.

The Contribution and Limits of Social Science

Lawyers and behaviourial and social scientists are from disparate
professional cultures. They think and speak with different languages,
or, sometimes, use the same words to express different thoughts. Their
implicit, unspoken, value systems are different. Each profession has its
own perception of reality (both of which are valid) and varying perceptions of what is relevant to the reality sought to be examined. What
lawyers think important, a clinician may not and vice versa. It follows
that communication between the professions is subject to misinterpretation and at risk of distortion.
Nevertheless, the insights and the developing knowledge of the social and behaviourial sciences are crucial to the development of a benign
family law and process, whatever the difficulties of communication. For
example, most mental health professionals of the 60s and 70s assumed
that divorce was a brief and transitory crisis from which adults and children would recover and go on to a better, happier life. 53 All of the studies referred to show that assumption to be wrong for many people and,
49. Kelly, supra note 18, at 121-22.
50. Judith S. Wallerstein, 30J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1022 (1991)

(Dr. Wallerstein's reply to a reader's Letter to the Editor).
51. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 22, at 328-30.
52. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (speculating as to the possible dimen-

sions of the social harm).
53. Wallerstein, supra note 28, at 19; WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10, at 24173.
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in particular, many children. The advice of the behaviourial sciences of
that time to the policy makers was greatly different than it would be
now. 5 4 The policy maker must be not only cautious of the "trendy" in
the behaviourial sciences, she must be equally cautious of the "trendy"
in the law.
Similarly, the policy maker must be aware that the search for exactness demanded by the behaviourial and social sciences necessarily limits
their inquiry. Fineman and Opie are correct when they say that "the
elevation of rationality as a primary virtue can result in the construction
of a model that depicts only a small segment of the 'real world'." 55 A
lawyer's perception of the "real world" is similarly limited.
The policy maker must also be aware that however rigorous the re56
search design of a behaviourial or social scientist, bias is inescapable.
The hypothesis of the researcher will necessarily structure the research
design and the data sought. Predisposition will necessarily affect the interpretation of the data. Furstenberg and Cherlin, in discussing the data
that only a minority of the children of divorce become chronically
sypmtomatic say that "[t]he glass is either half full or half empty, depending on one's point of view." 5 7 I illustrate my bias (as they have
theirs) when I question that policy makers should be content that as bad
as things are, they are not as bad as they might be.
The limitations of the studies referred to in this Article are readily
apparent. The sample sizes are necessarily small and some, arguably,
select. The longer the period of study, the smaller the sample studied.
The larger the sample, the more suspect becomes the methodology.
Nor can it be otherwise. It is impossible to conceive that resources can
be found to fund a nation-wide study to exclude all the variables or even
most of the variables of the human condition except the one under examination. If the problems illustrated by the data we now have are to be
addressed, society does not have enough time for the definitive study.
The foregoing brings out yet another cultural difference between
the sciences and the legal policy maker. The sciences necessarily seek
certainty. The policy maker, necessarily, if he is to serve the perceived
social need, must be content to act upon a preponderance of the best
evidence available. The evidence from the studies is that children of divorce are at greater risk of harm than are children in the general population. The question becomes: What are the dimensions of the problem?
D.

Economic and Social Effects
There is little information on the consequences for the society and
54.

Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act -

and Some

Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 48-52.
55. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policy .laking: Custody Determinationsat Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107, 128.
56.
57.

Id. at 124-30.
FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 46, at 69.
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the economy as a whole of endemic 58 family breakdown with its attendant risk to children. There is some basis for speculation. Take, as an
example (but not as fact), the findings of Wallerstein and Kelly 59 that
more than a third of the children of divorce whom they observed became chronically disabled in their functioning. 60 Suppose those findings applied across the general population. Suppose, further, that fifty
percent of children experience the separation of their parents. 6 1 This
would suggest divorce as a significant factor in disabling one-sixth of the
population. Society cannot afford that increase in the population of disabled children. The figures are not offered as fact, but as a possible
guide to the dimensions of the problems observed. Even if the incidence of disabled children of divorce is less than that found in the Wallerstein and Kelly sample, it is nevertheless so high as to command
attention.
The economic component of the harm to children of divorce as an
isolated factor contributing to dysfunction has not been measured.
Guidubaldi found, as we have seen, that low academic achievement and
lowered IQ among the children of divorce was related, in part, to economic factors, but that socio-behavioural problems were not.
In theory, adequate and enforced child support, adequate alimony
to the custodial parent or greater public subsidization of children of divorce 6 2 could correct the economic component of the harm. As will be
discussed later, however, there is seldom enough private money to go
around (since a separated family is economically inefficient) and adequate public subsidization is most unlikely.
The long-term consequences to the national economy of such a
large new group of under-functioning and malfunctioning children
(and, in the Wallerstein sample, young adults), must be serious, though
we do not yet have data on the macro-economic consequences.
Poor performance at school entry63 disadvantages the child's whole
academic career. Poor performance and limited education in later adolescence and early adulthood must have already diminished the economy's human resources. Both have been measured in higher
proportions among children of divorce than among the general population. The economy increasingly needs ever greater competence. This
new class of disadvantaged children appears unable to provide it. If the
problems have the dimensions they appear to have and diminish society's and the economy's capacity to function, can a change in the law
alleviate them?
58.

See authorities cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.
WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 22, at 211.
60. A higher proportion of dysfunction emerged in later years. Wallerstein, supra
note 28, at 20.
61. See authorities cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.

59.

62. Children of divorce are subsidized through various welfare programs, but public
support is gravely inadequate.
63. John Guidubaldi &Joseph D. Perry, Divorce, Socioeconomic Status, and Children s Cognitive-Social Competence at School EntrT, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 459 (1984).
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III.

DOES THE LAW MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Is the present high rate of divorce a consequence alone of social
and economic influences? Or is the transformation of the law a contributing cause? The conventional wisdom holds that the change in the law
in the 70s and 80s had no influence on the rate of divorce. 64 The argument is that the fault-based divorce laws had become so subverted by
collusion and perjury6 5 that legislative abandonment of fault made no
difference. The rate of divorce, it is argued, increased in response to the
changing social and economic milieu, and the changed law made no difference. Marvell, contrary to the conventional wisdom, found a significant correlation between no fault statutes and the rate of divorce
nationwide, but when the impact of changed law was examined state 66by
state, there was a significant correlation in only a minority of states.
Conventional wisdom is that the law does not matter, that people
will do what they will, regardless of the civil law, in response to the social and economic influences of the time. I am skeptical of such wisdom
for at least four reasons. First, the divorce rate from 1940-65 was essentially stable (with a bulge in 1945-46 immediately post-war). The rate
doubled from 1965-76.67 This must surely be more than coincidence
when one considers that there was not the slightest public clamour for
more liberalized divorce-it was a silent revolution, a revolution
brought about by "experts" pursuing their own agendas, quietly. 6 8 Second, trend lines can be adjusted to show differing results. Third, under
which law is the rate more likely to increase: One that facilitates divorce
or one that does not? Finally, how could family law not have an influence? Approximately fifty percent of adults have been exposed to it.
There is no doubt that the rate of divorce would not have increased
as rapidly as it did following the introduction of no fault divorce had not
the social and, even more, economic conditions been favourable to it.
The economy was relatively prosperous, and women, increasingly, were
less dependent (but still dependant, the more so with children); the
moral imperative had diminished. However, as we have seen, it was not
these and other social and economic conditions which prompted the
change in the law.
64. See, e.g., JACOB, supra note 5, at 162 (citing studies). See also Thomas B. Marvell,
Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 LAw & Soc'v REV. 543, 544, 546-48 (1989)(review

of the research).
65. 1 am not aware of any data nor is it likely that any could have been found. My
experience in Canada in the 1960s suggests that the legal profession was not as corrupt as
academics seem to think. Nor do I have any reason to suppose that Canadian lawyers were
any more upright than those in the United States. Nevertheless, collusion and perjury did
happen. Note that collusive divorces, to the extent they occurred, were necessarily con-

sensual-conceptually and in terms of ancillary relief different from unilateral divorce.
66. Marvell, supra note 64; (citing Weiss & Willis, An Economic Analysis of Divorce Settlements, unpublished, Population Research Centre, University of Chicago (1989)) (a positive
relationship found by a different method).
67. Wardle, supra note 2, at 139-41.
68. This is convincingly shown by JACOB, supra note 5, at 83. A 1982 poll showed,
inter alia, that a majority thought divorce laws should be more strict. Id.
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But there are other reasons to believe that the law makes a difference. 6 9 First, in a pluralistic society (as we are said to be), increasingly
detached from other value systems, the law alone may in time become a
predominant source of values. If the law says, contrary to the cultural
perception of the marriage covenant, 70 that marriage is a transitory arrangement severable at will by one of the parties to it, the law's perception, may in time, like Gresham's Law, change the former cultural
perception.
Second, the law has a regulatory function. 7 1 If family breakdown
creates a risk of doing harm to children, it is in society's interest that the
law do what it can in a free society to discourage it. The regulatory
power of civil law is limited. Law that seeks to impose a standard well
beyond the mores of the time will be evaded by one means or another.
The civil law cannot compel spouses to live together in harmony and
does not try. The law can, however, seek to encourage family stability
by financially penalizing the spouse who disrupts it and by rewarding the
spouse who keeps to the covenant (or, at least, securing, to the extent
possible, his or her economic interest). 72 Alimony was the principal
remedy 73 under the old law before law reform destroyed its conceptual
74
roots.
The old law did what it could to encourage family stability. It penalized a spouse erring in its eyes and secured the "innocent" spouse to the
extent possible. 75 With its theological roots, the old law was directly
interested in the rectitude of adults, but if family stability is in the interest of children, the law did what it could to protect them. The truly
69. This argument rejects the positivist and relativist allegedly value-neutral school of
legal thought, at least as it might influence such a socially sensitive issue as family law. I do
not agree that the law should do no more than adapt itself to a perceived (or, more likely,
presumed) least common denominator of human behaviour-the "equity of the mean" as
Max Weber has called it. In this discussion, I am indebted to Mary Ann Glendon, in MARY
ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN

CHALLENGES (1987).
70. Marriage as a life-long commitment remains deeply rooted in our culture. There
is strong evidence that is so, including the fact that marriage remains a significant personal, family and community festival. Marriage vows, civil and religious, continue to involve a serious life-long commitment. Popular literature, arts and advertisements assume
marriage is a lasting commitment. Notwithstanding the law's inducements to divorce,
about half of married couples stay married. This author does not find Bellah and his colleagues' assumption that there is a changed ethos of marriage wholly convincing in the
face of the evidence to the contrary. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
71. In this context, I equate its protective as well as its dispute-resolving function.
72. I do not here intend to suggest that there is an analogy between contract and the
marriage covenant. There is not. The attempt to suggest that there is has only served to
distort our thinking about family issues. Marriage is sui generis. See Mary E. O'Connell,
Alimony After No-Fault: A Practicein Search of a Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437 (1988); Carl
E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
197; Ira Mark Ellman, The Theoy of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1989).
73. In few urban families is property division an adequate remedy. Sanctions and
rewards of the civil law (at least in family cases) are not likely to be wholly effective for
families below the "middle" middle-class.
74. See authorities cited supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75. Today, of course, the gender discrimination of former alimony law would have to
be removed.
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remarkable aspect of no fault divorce is that it is wholly adult-centred,
with the welfare of children subservient to adult interest. In that sense,
no fault divorce, in theoretically abjuring sanctions and rewards, does
what it can to encourage divorce because of the economic benefits to
one spouse or the other.
To what extent can the penalties and rewards of the law influence
marital conduct? We may be thankful that people, particularly in their
intimate relations, may not look to the law as their guide. Yet one wonders, as the knowledge of the present law's economic incentives to the
economically stronger spouse to divorce permeate the culture and the
law's values displace traditional values, whether the incentives will not
be increasingly acted upon.
Further, the law has an hortative function. In the classical view, it
was the purpose of law to promote virtue, a view which is now unfashionable 76 if only because, it is said, the state ought not to define
virtue in a diverse society. If, however, family instability puts children at
risk, I assume that there can be a broad consensus even in a morally
diverse society that the law ought to do what it can to encourage stability. On such an issue law cannot be morally neutral. For the law to be
neutral about the welfare of children is to say, as essentially no fault
divorce law does, that their welfare takes second place to the "happi77
ness" of adults in the eyes of the law.

Further, Glendon, following Gertz and White, points out that
-[b]ecause law is also constitutive, it is incumbent on us to be attentive,
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in the 'stories we tell,' the 'symbols we deploy,' and the 'visions we project'. "78 In time, these stories,
symbols and visions may, as we have seen, displace other values of the
79
culture.
What stories does the present law tell? What is its message? It says,
among other things, that the marriage covenant is freely and unilaterally
terminable, that the welfare of children is subservient to the personal
fulfillment of adults, that a parent's affective relationship with his or her
children may be terminated at any time without cause at the will of the
other parent. 80
76. But see, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 69; Schneider, supra note 72.
77. GLENDON, supra note 69, at 139; Schneider, supra note 72, at 236-37.
78. GLENDON, supra note 69, at 142.

79. For example, Chambers argues that with the waning sense of moral responsibility
of the non-custodial parent, perhaps unwillingly separated from his children at the will of
his former wife without cause, the law may be changed to eliminate child support or limit it
to a transitional period. David L. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1614-15 (1982).
80. Furstenberg and Nord found that: (a) "marital disruption effectively destroys any
on-going relationship between children and biological parents living outside the home in a
majority of cases;" (b) less than half the children had seen the absent parent in a year; (c)
20% had not seen him in more than five years; and (d) normally when there is contact, the
relationship is social, not instrumental. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Christine Winquest
Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns of Childrearing After MaritalDisruption, 47 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.

895 (1985). A recent study in Canada and Scotland found significant structural and emotional obstacles to anything like shared parenting after divorce in many cases. Edward
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Lastly, even if everyone cannot or will not respond to the exhortations of the civil law, if the message of the law is less than the culture's
ideal, 8 ' then, as we have seen, that lesser norm, in time, can displace
other societal values in the same way that debased currency drives out
good currency. The analogy is more than theoretical: if family stability
is in the interest of a child and one parent seeks to achieve that ideal
while the other parent, with the permission of the law does not, the latter will prevail. That is, even if the civil law cannot compel socially beneficial conduct, it can impede it if socially beneficial conduct is not
encouraged by the law.
If, as I have argued, the law does make a difference, why did the
82
family law reformers go wrong?
IV.

THE FAILURE OF SCHOLARSHIP

83

A Canadian survey, Law and Learning,8 4 drew a distinction between
what it called doctrinal research and fundamental research in law.8 5
Doctrinal research analyzes law (and recommends change) within the
context of established doctrine. Fundamental research, in addition,
looks to the underlying social forces, the needs to be served, the probable consequences of change and so on. In so doing, the fundamental
researcher in law will look not only to her own discipline but to the insights that all other relevant disciplines can bring to bear.
For example, were fundamental research to be done on family
law
reform, questions would be asked such as: What is the nature and purpose of marriage and the family in the eyes of the state? To what extent
should the law in a free society intervene in marital and family affairs
and decisions? Such questions would inevitably lead into questions
about how the needs and welfare of children can best be served within
the framework of the law. In searching for answers, the researcher
would look to the sort of people brought together by the Ripon
86
Project.
Kruk, Psychological and StructuralFactors Contributingto the Disengagementof Noncustodial Fathers
After Divorce, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 81 (1992). The Kruk study is important as

the first to examine reasons for the breakdown of relationships between children and nonresidential divorced fathers.
81. That is, assuming, as I do, that society as a whole still values the welfare of
children.
82. That they did is, I submit, beyond argument, if only because of the unanticipated
consequences. See Weitzman, supra note 3.
83. The thinking of the reformers is well outlined in JAcoB, supra note 5. But see Levy,
supra note 54, at 45: "The most unrelenting criticisms appear.., to have been designed
primarily to serve the theoretical or ideological agenda of the critic rather than some
sensible law reform agenda."
84. CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN LAW, LAW AND LEARNING,
REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA 65-72

(1983).
85. In French, recherches ponctuelles and recherchesublime, which may more clearly suggest

the distinction.
86. One recent, innovative and overdue response to the problems of the revolution
was a symposium in April, 1991, jointly sponsored by the American Bar Association and
Ripon College entitled "Family Law and the 'Best Interest of the Child'." A group of 40
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The law reformers did not do fundamental research. 8 7 Their focus
was on the correction of the ills wrought by fault-based regimes of divorce-the exacerbation of acrimony thought to be implicit in adversarial divorce; the perjurious, consensual nature of divorce law in
practice which was condoned by the courts. 88
Their correction was no fault divorce. It was a path they need not
have taken. But no fault divorce, necessarily, required a fundamental
reconsideration of the property, alimony and custodial regimes. This
the reformers undertook with admirable ingenuity. And today, their solutions offer ample fodder for academics, a comfortable living for lawyers, busywork for judges that is on occasion intellectually challenging,
as well as an ever-growing divorce industry. 89
As a result, the equitable jurisdiction states 9 ° (and Canada, including formerly community property Quebec) have been left with elaborate
and inefficient 9 i family property regimes resting on contrived rationales
of dubious tenability9 2 -rationales in the current jargon which boil
down to "contribution" and "partnership." ' 93 A basic flaw in the rationales is that they are modelled on a theory of the marriage covenant that
no fault divorce denies, namely, that spouses will contribute, each in his
and her own way, and will be faithful to the partnership. Under no fault,
the faithful contributing spouse has no remedy against the spouse who is
unfaithful and/or non-contributing.
specialists from a number of disciplines-judges, lawyers, pediatricians, mental-health
professionals, child-development specialists, social historians, anthropologists, educators
and ethicists-were invited to consider what children need and fundamental changes in
law that can best foster their optimal development. Additional "Ripon Project" symposia
are in the planning stage. The Ripon Project is innovative. For the first time in North
America, a discussion of family law reform begins with fundamentals: What do children
need? What framework of law can best serve these needs?
87. But see Levy, supra note 54. The advisors to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws included representatives of the social and behaviourial sciences. Commissioners, advisors and reporters necessarily brought individual agendas to
the discussions. Further, it must be recognized that the advice of the social and
behaviourial sciences today with all that has been learned since the 1970s would be greatly
different than it was then. See JACOB, supra note 5; UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
9A U.L.A. (1979) and commentary.
88. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 91-97. Wardle questions whether no fault divorce
achieved its limited objectives. Id. at 97-112.
89. The phrase, "divorce industry" so far as I know, originated with Mr. Justice Raymond Watson, formerly of the Family Division of the Australian High Court, one of the
pioneers in Australia in family law reform. It refers to the growing number of judges,
lawyers, mental health professionals, mediators, accountants, tax experts, appraisers,
evaluators, actuaries and so on who, under the legislation, have become necessary to serve
the industry.
90. I do not extend the analysis to community property states.
91. "Inefficient" as used here means costly to administer. Alimony, lump sum and
periodic, rid of some of the encrustations of the past, is the more efficient remedy, but is
inconsistent with no fault divorce.
92. A thorough analysis of the untenability of the theories is beyond the scope of this
Article. But see, e.g., 23 FAM. L.Q. 147-381 (1989) ("Special Issue on Property Division at
Divorce"). A critical reading of these essentially doctrinal analyses well illustrates the
point.
93. Even if the partnership analogy is misleading and distorting, it will be an insensitive husband and an imprudent politician who denies that marriage is a partnership.
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The essential flaw in the theories is that they do not serve the social
need. In most urban family circumstances there is not enough property
to go around. Yet to be consistent with the premises of no fault divorce,
property division was necessarily put forward as the predominant economic remedy for divorce, and alimony was relegated to an occasional,
short term, "bridging" remedy.
We, today, with the benefit of hindsight, may wonder that when fundamental change in the nature of marriage and the parent-child relationship was in contemplation, the need to consider an equally radical
change in the family property regime in the interests of children was not
apparent. Alimony, much more clearly than property division, was cast
adrift from its former theoretical roots, its rationale, by no fault divorce.
If marriage is freely terminable at any time without cause; if, in the eyes
of the law, marriage is no more than a temporary liaison of two individuals for so long as it is convenient to both and who go back to their two
solitudes upon divorce, why should either have any continuing responsi94
bility for the other?
That alimony has uneasily survived its illogic under no fault reflects
the need for it. But an ancillary remedy without roots in a defensible
rationale consistent with law can, at best, give rise to inconsistent application and, at worst, perceived injustice.
The loss of alimony as a viable remedy has a most direct impact on
children of divorce. For if a child's custodial parent is poor, so must be
the child. 9 5 Nor, under the logic of no fault divorce can that poverty be
remedied by adequate child support under private law, 96 because its
logic demands that a custodial parent not share in any benefit to the
child.
In distinction, the rationale for the property and alimony regimes
under the old law, whatever its flaws, was soundly based in it. Marriage
was a lifelong covenant to be severed only for a grave breach. Until
death or remarriage, the "innocent" spouse (and children in her care)
were, in theory, entitled to what they would have enjoyed but for the
breach.
The changes in the custodial regime were, on the face of it, not as
far-reaching, but may have been, in substance, more profound. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act proposed the already recognized
"best interests" test as the guide in determining custody but recommended that conduct, unrelated to the children, be removed from the
court as a discretion structuring factor. Thus, not only did no fault divorce change the nature of the marriage covenant, 9 7 it changed the parent-child relationship from one that was assumed to be sacrosanct (in
94. See authorities cited supra note 72 and accompanying text.
95. The positive relationship between family income and children's academic achievement and IQis well established. See generally supra note 63, at 466-67.
96. Even if there were enough monetary resources to go around. In most family circumstances, there is not.
97. See WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 366-68.
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the absence of grave misconduct) to one that is terminable for all practical purposes"8 by the other parent without cause.
The reformers did not intend to change the nature of the marriage
covenant or the parent-child relationship. But in their too narrow focus
on the ills of fault-based divorce, in their failure to do fundamental research, to think fundamentally, the reformers, unwittingly, as we now
know, profoundly changed the parent-child relationship"9 and, to the
extent that the law has influence, changed the husband-wife relationship, two relationships basic to the functioning of society.
Another gift of reform has been the most bizarre and thought distorting jargon ranging from the offensive-"rehabilitative maintenance," for example, to the misleading-"clean break," "partnership"
and "equality," words that become icons detached from the limited reality which spawned them, which ignore the total reality and prevent us
from thinking clearly how to serve the underlying social need.
Consider "equality," a principal icon, for example. Surely it is now
the cultural perception that the equality of spouses is the very basis of
what marriage ought to be-equality of commitment, of management, of
obligation. But these words do not readily translate into words of law.
Men and women have differing needs 0 0 and the law's arithmetic equality does not serve them. Those who must show a proper reverence for
the icon "equality" at law, yet who recognize the differing needs, have
had to devise daedalian rationales for what might be called "asymmetrical equality."' 0 '
Would we not think more clearly about what the law ought to be if
we were to call "a spade a spade" and recognize need for what it is? But
with need goes an obligation to meet it and such an obligation is outside
the context of no fault divorce.
With hindsight and more than twenty years of experience under the
premises of no fault divorce, we can better see their flaws than could the
reformers. And the hubris of that time is no longer with us. We now
better know that we must think fundamentally if we seek to change law
affecting the fundamental institution of society. It is to be regretted that
the now vast, and, for the most part, excellent, literature on legal issues
affecting the family remains doctrinally captive so that the remedies proposed are no more than palliative and do not get to the root of the
problems we face.
V.

REMEDIES

Of the many proposals to alleviate the risk of harm to children of
98. See authorities cited supra note 80 and accompanying text.
99. See JACOB, supra note 5, at 133 (Levy appears to have considered the custodial
issue in more depth than the Commissioners were prepared to accept).
100. O'Connell puts it neatly: "Women are not damaged men .. . [they] are not undamaged men either." O'Connell, supra note 72 at 506-07.
101. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for
Distribution of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q 279 (1989).
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divorce in the context of no fault, I will do no more than touch upon a
few broad categories. First, the economic component of the harm to
children' 0 2 was sought to be addressed in the federally required child
support guidelines. Overdue and prudent as that measure was, a recent
study has found that the changes brought about by passage of the guidelines have been modest. 103 The inescapable fact remains that separated
parenting is economically inefficient. In the majority of circumstances,
separated parents do not have the resources to support their children
adequately. 10 4 The extent of child poverty attributable to divorce is a
product of the high incidence of divorce. 10 5
Second, there have been recent congressional suggestions that the
"waiting period" for divorce should be increased to give couples time to
"sober up" (as one report put it) and consider reconciliation. 10 6 The
proposal has its flaws. Until 1985, a ground for divorce in Canada was,
in theory, three years consensual separation. In practice, the "waiting
period" was detrimental to women and children in that during the separation period, they were denied some of the spectrum of remedies avail10 7
able on divorce.
There is no evidence that people do "sober up" during the waiting
period. The tensions and uncertainties of unresolved issues are not
conducive to reconciliation. Further, time reduces the chances of women for remarriage more than it does for men, and pre-divorce liaisons
are much more open to men than they are for women with children.
Nevertheless, there is some symbolism, some "message" in law that says
102. Which, as we have seen, is real but which has not been measured as an isolated
factor.
103. Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy,
Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 345 (1991). The study
involved only three states: Colorado, Hawaii and Illinois, with different guideline models.
The results in other states may differ.
104. See generally Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1990).
105. It is to be recognized that the impoverishment of children of divorce is only one
corner of growing child poverty in general, which is so detrimental to the society of both
the United States and Canada and has such short and long run economic implications, if
only because you cannot educate a hungry child. Growing child poverty is the result of a
spectrum of changed social and economic policies: the unweaving of the support network
during the prosperity of the 1980s, tax and welfare policies increasingly detrimental to
children, family law and so on. See, e.g., U.S. Panel Warns on Child Poverty, N.Y. TIMES NATIONAL, April 27, 1990, at A22 (citing a report of the National Commission on Children);
SYLVIA A. HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COSTS OF NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN
(1991). There has been an enormous transfer of wealth from the young (that is, those who
raise children) to the old in the last two decades. Iver Peterson, Why Older People are Richer
Than Other Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at E3. It is truly astonishing that during a
time when "family values" are on so many political lips (which we, apparently, are intended to read) the tax exemption for children has been reduced. It was 42% of per capita
income in 1948 and is now 11%. Steven A. Holmes, Unlikely Union Arises to Press Family
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at A18. In Canada (before the imposition of the Goods
and Services Tax in 1990), a married couple earning the median income with two children
paid marginally more tax (100.1%) than a childless couple earning the same income.
106. See Holmes, supra note 104.
107. The result might be somewhat different in the United States. In Canada, divorce
and ancillary relief, custody and maintenance, are under federal jurisdiction. There are
some pre-divorce remedies under provincial jurisdiction.
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one cannot be quickly freed from the marriage covenant. It is questionable, however, that longer "waiting periods" would reduce the rate of
divorce sufficiently to justify the detriments.10 8
Third, joint custody in various guises-from joint residential custody to a right on the part of the access parent to be consulted about
major decisions affecting the child-is now the statutory preference in a
majority of states. The rationale for joint custody rests on two concepts.
First, that children of divorce do best when they maintain a close relationship with both separated parents.' 0 9 Second, that parent and child
have a right to a continuing relationship after divorce. "Parents are Forever" was coined to express these two concepts." 0
Notwithstanding the broad acceptance of the idea of joint custody
and it attractiveness, there have been no long-range and few shorter
range studies regarding the impact of joint residential custody on children. We know nothing (except that which can be speculated from theories of child development) about infants and joint custody-at a time
when parent-child bonding, if it is to occur, must occur.
Johnston and her colleagues conducted a study of children in postdivorce conflicted families where there was court ordered joint custody
or frequent access. Their findings were grave indeed. A comparison of
that group and children in sole custody showed the former to be more
dysfunctional than the latter. l I
It seems clear that the automatic imposition ofjoint custody without
skilled and time-consuming assessment of the families can be detrimental to children. But, on the other hand, if as a rule of thumb, joint custody or frequent access are ordered only when there is agreement, the
non-residential parent is hostage to the continuing goodwill of the residential parent-an intolerable situation if there is to be equity to both
the children and the absent parent. Moreover, it makes an ass of the
law. 112
There are perhaps irremovable structural reasons for the findings of
Furstenberg and Nord l3 that divorce terminates the absent parent's
108. It is clear, of course, that if the full spectrum of ancillary relief were available
during the "waiting period," the separation would be permanent and the chance of resumed cohabitation no greater than that of remarriage to one another after divorce.
109. See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 22. But see FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN,
supra note 46, at 73-76 (Furstenberg and Cherlin, with their different methodology, found
no correlation between children's adjustment to divorce and their relationship with an
absent parent).
110. The phrase is that of Meyer Elkin, formerly director of the Los Angeles County
Conciliation Court. Elkin was a pioneer and a leader from the 1950s on of the conciliation
court movement.
I 11. See JANET R. JOHNSTON & LINDA E. G. CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT (1988); Janet R. Johnston et al., Latency Children in Post-Separationand Divorce Disputes, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 563 (1985);
Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and
FrequentAccess, 59 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576 (1989).
112. Experience suggests the sanction against the obdurate parent of losing custody is
seldom a realistic alternative. When patterns of separated parenting have been established
it is very difficult, and often impossible, to change them.
113. See Furstenberg & Nord, supra note 80.
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parent-child relationship in the majority of cases and that in the majority
of the remainder, the relationship is social, not affective. A recent study
of disengaged divorced fathers found substantial structural impediments
to continued parent-child engagement of non-residential fathers. A notable finding was that many fathers who were most engaged with their
children during marriage eventually ceased contact because their
profound sense of loss and bereavement as well as the artificial access
conditions made a continued truncated relationship too painful." 14
Fourth, therapists" 15 propose that the harm to children of divorce
that they have observed can be reduced therapeutically. In response to
the conciliation court movement 1 6 there are now court-connected
programmes in most jurisdictions of varying elaborateness conducted by
persons with varying credentials and skills to mediate or conciliate issues
involving children and their future parenting and to counsel parents and
children.
To say that there has been no overall" 7 assessment of such
programmes and their long-term results is not to diminish their value.
Social experience does not yet offer guidance in the difficult art of separated parenting. There is no social knowledge and almost no empirically based clinical guidance in the even more difficult art of stepparenting. Therapeutic programmes, even if they do no more than raise
some consciousness of the difficulties, must have value. There is no
doubt that in skilled hands (of which there are too few) some children
can be saved from harm.
Yet there is no evidence that such programmes, extended as they
are, have or can significantly reduce the incidence of harm to children of
divorce."l 8 It is doubtful that we have the resources in money or in
uniquely skilled personnel to be able to address the problem in all its
dimensions. In any event, if the law is counter-therapeutic, the law will
prevail.
There is another issue: state intrusion into parenting through doctrinal" 9 therapeutic intervention following divorce is now on a scale
114. Kruk, supra note 80.
115. "Therapists" is used here generically for lack of a better word to encompass all
those in "helping professions" of different disciplines who assist, in a number of ways, to
resolve the human issues of divorce and ameliorate the consequences.
116. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the nature and extent of the movement, its ideological thrusts or to assess their merits. In general, the movement seeks to
humanize the divorce process, to observe and within the possible, correct the consequences. It is interesting and perhaps regrettable that conciliation (to use the term
broadly) has had no legal analysis although through it, for the most part, judges in practice, if not in form, delegate decision-making involving children (but not their support)
and their future parenting to therapists.
117. See 30 FAM. AND CONCILIATION CTS. REV. (April, 1992) which is devoted to reports
on court-connected mediation and conciliation in California.
118. See, e.g.,Johnston, supra note 11; Furstenberg & Nord, supra note 80; Kruk, supra
note 80.
119. This refers to the fact that, of necessity, state administered programmes (e.g. mediation, conciliation, counselling, child custody assessment) must be doctrinally conforming within themselves. It does not mean that the programmes are necessarily
homogeneous across the nation-nor that the doctrines followed are necessarily "wrong."
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about which a free society might be uneasy, however benign the intent
and the therapeutic accomplishment.
In summary, the experience so far does not suggest that the continuing search for the "best" custodial/access regime and therapeutic guidance has or is likely to obviate the structural impediments to effective
separated parenting or to significantly reduce the incidence of harm to
children of divorce. That does not mean, given the present state of the
law, that we should not try or, in trying, ignore the risks of state intrusion that trying involves.
Fifth, Weitzman, 120 Glendon t 2 ' and others propose what Glendon
calls a "children first" regime of property division, alimony and child
support to remedy the economic component of harm to children and the
economic deprivation of custodial mothers. Without going into the details, 12 2 they propose that the needs of children have a first call on the
income of the non-custodial parent and the family home. For example,
Weitzman proposes that a custodial mother be granted either title to the
family home or a right of occupation while the children are dependant.
Neither she nor Glendon recommend that a child's interest in family
property be expressly recognized but rather that it be derivative through
the custodial parent.
A "child first" policy is attractive conceptually, but there are substantial practical and theoretical impediments to it. It does not address
the psychic component of harm to children. It does not recognize the
economic inefficiency of separated parenting and would leave in effect
law which facilitates that inefficiency. However draconian its measures
against the non-custodial parent, in the majority of family circumstances, he will seldom have enough to maintain his family at an adequate standard without public subsidization, 123 no matter what penury
is imposed on him.
What I call the theoretical impediments to a "child first" policy
However, following Bellah, Glendon says that the therapeutic culture "not only refuses to
take a moral stand, it actively promotes distrust of'morality'." GLENDON, supra note 69, at
108 n. 113. That is, in this context, it exalts perceived self interest at the expense of obligation to others or to the society. "Americans are seldom as selfish as the therapeutic culture
urges them to be." BELLAH ET AL., supra note 70, at 112. Thus, the crucial involvement of
the therapeutic community in family law decision-making reinforces the adult-centredness,
implicit in no fault divorce. As noted before, the law appears to be counter-cultural: the
cultural perception of marriage and family is on a "higher," less self-centred, plane than is
the law. It is, of course, an argument of this Article that the law's perception must, of
necessity, in time displace that of the culture.
120. WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 379-87. Weitzman gives detailed proposals for reme-

dying the economic consequences of no fault divorce within its context, which are a more
or less unseverable "package." Id. at 357-401. The text refers to those most directly affecting children, but all have an indirect impact.
121.

GLENDON, supra note 69, at 91-104.

122. For example, that there should be three classes of marriage and divorce-short
childless marriages, those with dependent children and those involving older women who
have reared now independent children. Arguably, the details of the proposals are crucial if
one is to assess their effects, but they are beyond the scope of this Article.
123. Weitzman seeks an equalization of standards of living in the separated households. This would mean, in most circumstances, a significant reduction from that formerly
enjoyed by the children. WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 380.
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within the context of no fault divorce are substantial. In operation, the
proposal would surely leave the adult self-interestedness of the custodial
parent with the benefits of no fault divorce and leave the non-custodial
parent to pay most of its costs. 124 The proposal is inconsistent with and
against the tenets of no fault divorce, namely, that each adult is equally
free to terminate a marriage at any time without cause, to equally share
in the acquests of it and each, thereafter, to have the fruits of her and his
individual efforts. 12 5 Law which is not equitably coherent within itself
cannot stand, however benign its intent. Finally, Wardle came more directly to the point of harm to children of divorce by tentatively proposing that "divorces involving minor children [might be] excluded from no
fault divorce processes or be subject to more protective no fault divorce
2 6
procedures." 1
The Wardle proposal for different grounds of divorce when there
are children and when there are not, is of a different dimension than the
"child first" policy. Different grounds of divorce necessarily mean that
the marriage covenant at law changes once there are children. What
changes in the alimony, property and custodial regimes are suggested?
What would be the grounds of divorce? Would the pre-child marriage
be, in effect, only a trial marriage to become "real" only when a child
was born-with what impact on the alimony and property regime?
I argue that for the law to recognize differing classes of marriage
giving rise to differing grounds of divorce and differing economic enti1 27
tlements and obligations is to diminish the institution of marriage;
and that society's interest in the welfare of children is best and most
simply and logically served by sustaining that institution. The complexities of any other approach are formidable.
In summary, I submit that the ever more elaborate search for palliatives will, in the end, be unavailing because they do not get to the root of
the problem, the high incidence of divorce facilitated by the law and the
128
consequent risk of harm to children.
Does not the question come down to this: If the law influences the
rate of divorce (as I argue it does) and if divorce puts children at risk and
they do best in an intact family (in the absence of exposure to abuse or
marked spousal conflict), should not the law do what it can to encourage
124. Weitzman's proposal for equalization of standards would, in theory, avoid the
problem. But maintaining the family home for children either by transfer to the custodial
parent or postponement of sale while the children are dependant (with all the practical
and financial difficulties involved) would be at the individual cost of the non-custodial parent. This is true even if determining the respective standards of living included a right on
the part of the non-custodial parent to own or occupy a property equivalent to the family
home. Such duplication is within the means of only a few.
125. To state the proposition in its stark terms is to show its fallacy in the real world.
The reformers, of course, had to dilute the stark premise to grudgingly allow for the facts
that women are sometimes economically disadvantaged by marriage and that children are,
as the premises of no fault divorce would have it, an economic liability.
126. Wardle, supra note 2, at 133-35.
127. Bearing in mind, as Groucho Marx has told us, "that marriage is a great institution
but who wants to live in an institution?"
128. Together with other problems accompanying a high incidence of divorce.
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family stability, rather than facilitating instability? Finding the answer to
that question seems to be urgent.
VI.

DIRECTIONS

A beginning, if not yet a substantial literature, calls for a changed
direction in the law, new law that encourages family stability. Bartlett
urges that family law ought to be based on "notions of benevolence and
responsibility . . . [that] reinforce parental dispositions toward generos-

ity and other-directedness .... ,,129 Minow says that the law must not
create "obstacles to affiliation;" that it should "nurture the relationships
between individuals that constitute families."' 130 Schneider would go
further in saying that the law of divorce (and, therefore, of marriage)
should emphasize the unity of spouses and not their separateness; that it
should emphasize their obligations to each other and not their autonomy.' 3 Hafen argues that the individualism of no fault divorce is, in
fact, counter-productive; that true freedom arises from and, for its exercise, is dependent on belonging; that, in any event, a sense of belonging
is crucial to a child's capacity to become a individual.' 3 2 We know beyond doubt that these ideals, these aspirations, are just those under
which children can best be nurtured. The vitality of the society and its
economy, in turn, depends on the quality of their nurture.
What framework of law can best help people to try to reach these
ideals? Turning the clock back to a fault-based regime of divorce is, I
suggest, repugnant to most of us. Yet policy options based on "notions
of benevolence," that "nurture relationships," and "emphasize obligations, not autonomy" and which, at the same time, do not reintroduce
the flaws of the old law are not yet clearly apparent. To find them, is, I
suggest, a pressing need, and will require a reorientation of thinking
among legal scholars.
We must bear in mind Ronald Coase's caution in another context:
[I]n choosing between social arrangements within the context
of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind
that a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of
others ....

In devising and choosing between social arrange-

ments we should have regard for the total effect. This, above
33
all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.'
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